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BOOK REVIEWS 
The American Language of Rights. By Richard A. Primus. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. 280. 
$54.95.) 
Richard P1imus's The American Language of Rights is a 
well-reasoned and thoughtful response to those scholars (such as 
Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, John Rawls, Joseph Raz and 
Cass Sunstein) and practitioners who use American rights as rea-
sons, meaning that they are often employed as if they have no 
normative underpinnings, and/or regard rights as a philosophi-
cally sophisticated and consistent doctrine, the meaning of which 
has unfolded over time to envelop all members of the political 
community and many of its demands. Instead, according to Pri-
mus, rights are a social practice informed by substantive political 
commitments. Those commitments are embodied in the rights 
we create which then change in response to social and historical 
conditions. If rights, Primus inquires, do not hail from God, na-
ture, or abstract human reason, for example, and they have not 
meant the same things over the course of American history, then 
why is it that certain claims enjoy the status of rights? Moreo-
ver, why have the form and content of rights changed over time, 
and what factors influenced the ways in which we talk about, 
construct, and apply rights? Rights discourse thus develops 
"through a pattern of adversity, reaction, and synthesis" (129), 
which is illustrated, he argues, in three critical historical periods 
that have altered rights in fundamental ways: the Founding, Re-
construction, and World War II. If rights are in fact a social 
practice (as opposed to a formal understanding of rights such as 
those premised on a universal set of moral or normative impera -
tives) that have the capacity to change in response to historical 
circumstances, it would stand to reason that the "language of 
rights does not attach to only one kind of political outcome" (2). 
Instead it has been a "versatile tool, suitable for many different 
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agendas" (3) , in opposition to many of the critical legal studies 
and communitarian scholars who want to argue that rights dis-
course has a tendency to "favor one set of political outcomes 
over another" (2)-a claim Primus considers "widely overstated" 
(2). 
Hence Primus argues that during the Founding, there were 
multiple sources of rights: traditional English liberties, natural 
rights, reason, benefit and God. The founders and other politi-
cally engaged individuals drew upon those sources to speak 
about rights in ways that would justify opposition to specific ad-
versities, such as the abuse of legislative power, as well as "re-
membered" adversities, like the forced quartering of British 
troops in private homes. 
As Americans progress into the Reconstruction era, what 
gets counted as a right and to whom certain rights ought to be 
expanded changes substantially in response to the conclusion of 
the Civil War and the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Again, the language of rights is partially embedded in earlier 
understandings but also creates new ones to accommodate re-
sponses to unique historical occurrences-and Primus argues 
persuasively in this chapter that the Reconstruction era saw 
much less in the way of rights claims made from abstract princi-
ple than in any of the other t\vo key periods. Instead, many of 
the Northern whites who became active abolitionists did so at 
least partially because of their fear of what denying or limiting 
the free speech and labor opportunities of former slaves, for ex-
ample , might do to their own rights to the same. 
It is during this period as well that political scholarship and 
practice begin to refer to rights as belonging to one of three cate-
gories: civil, political or social. This division, which is by no 
means stable , was an attempt to legitimate selective application 
of rights to African-Americans, where early on they were to en-
joy only civil rights, or "the minimum basic requirements for 
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distinguishing free persons from slave laborers" (155), but not 
political and social rights that would guarantee the suffrage, the 
right to hold office and equal access to public accommodations 
(particularly white educational facilities). As the denial of a 
certain "political" or "social" right to African-Americans became 
politically untenable, it was simply re-categorized as a civil right 
until "civil rights" became "synonymous with legal or constitu-
tional rights in general" ( 160). 
The third period that demonstrates a definitive shift in how 
we talk about rights in the American context, according to Pri-
mus, is the years immediately following World War II, during 
which the primary adversary was totalitarianism as informed by 
the practices and ideologies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet 
Union. It is during this period that a "new vocabulary of 'human 
rights ' arose to carry the content of those political commitments 
and to link them with a broader idea rarely seen in the generation 
before the war but ascendant thereafter: that certain rights exist 
and must be respected regardless of the positive law" (178). 
I was surprised, however, to encounter virrually no care-
ful discussion of the individual character of rights. That is, we 
are indeed a culture of rights, and those rights, as Primus deftly 
points out, have changed in important and fundamental ways due 
to social and historical conditions. Yet American rights are not 
just this. If we can say anything that is distinctive about Ameri-
can rights it is that they almost always only accrue to individuals. 
Primus clearly and persuasively illustrates the ways in which the 
Founding, Reconstruction, and Worid War II altered how we 
think about rights-what we say about them. what gets counted 
as a right, etc.-but there is almost no mention of to whom those 
rights are to apply. I find this perplexing because if American 
rights have predominantly been individual rights. might not such 
an understanding privilege a certain kind of political outcome? 
It might very well favor liberal political arrangements to the ex-
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clusion of other types, but it is not at all clear that liberalism can 
satisfy the demands of justice and/or democracy. 
Early on Primus states that the language of rights does not 
favor only one kind of political outcome because (1) the relation-
ship between language and politics is reciprocal, and (2) it is 
historical fact that "people with all sorts of differing political 
views can use the language of rights to their advantage" (2). 
Generally speaking , rights need not engender excessive indi-
vidualism , as some communitarians allege , but they can operate 
to privilege rights over responsibilities and self-interest over co-
operation when they function in an already individualistic politi-
cal culture dominated by a language that prioritizes claims made 
on behalf of individuals (as opposed to groups , for example). In 
such a climate , citizens with very different ideas (i.e. non-liberal 
ideas) may very well be able to employ the language of rights to 
make their claims , but some claims will not be heard-and even 
if heard, will continually be dismissed (because the claims entail 
non-liberal solutions for the satisfaction of justice and/or require 
a recognition of demands made by citizens as members of some 
group). To put it more directly , Primus is keenly aware of the 
ways in which American rights have been conditioned both by 
inherited understandings of rights and the novel uses to which 
they can be put to stave off undesirable political outcomes, yet 
he fails to interrogate the ways in which rights are too often for-
mulated by those who already enjoy a privikged status in the 
polity (and presumably want to retain that status). For the privi-
leged , an ethos of individualism and individual rights has the 
capacity to work almo st flawles sly. For those marginalized due 
to their race , class, gender , and/or sexuality , such an ethos often 
functions to justify that marginalization on the basis of misper-
ception of interests or simple laziness- but not as the result of a 
systemati c flaw. 
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With that said, Richard Primus's The American Language 
of Rights ought to be required reading for anyone interested in 
the practice of American rights. His analysis of historical docu-
ments to bolster his claims about the construction and recon-
struction of rights is exemplary and persuasive. Furthermore, his 
arguments illustrating the erroneous ways in which rights are 
often used as final justifications for political propositions-and 
even more otlen referred to as if they have always meant the 
same things-are well-informed and convincing. 
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